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KEITH M. CARLSON
f-IF: Reagan administration has embarked on an
ambitious program to siow the growth of fhderal
spending, a program that is part of an o’e ra] I
economic plan to reduce inflation and promote
sustainable economic growth. The purpose of
slowing the growth of federal outlays in the overall
program is to shift resources from the public to the
private sector.
As of July 15. 1981, the administration had pro-
posed a reduction in the growth of federal outlays
over the next five years to a 6.2 percent annual rate,
down from an estimated 12.5 percent annual rate
from 1976 to 1981.’ The planned slowing in federal
spending is especially pronounced in the early years
of the projection period. Outlays are projected to
grow at only a 4.7 percent rate from 1981 to 1984,
fhllowed by an 8.6 percent rate from 1984 to 1986.
The spending plan is targeted to reduce federal
outlays to 18.6 percent of GNP in 1986 from an
estimated 23.0 percent in 1981.
A considerable amount of budget discussion is
couched in terms of expenditure ‘cuts.’’ For the
most part, however, these spending pi ans are not
cuts atall, hutreductions in spending from what they
would otherwise he. Thus, any attempt to assess
1)11dget developments and/or the administration
program must come to grips with that elusi ~t esti-
mate of what outlays would otherwise he.’’ The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has prepared a
set of such estimates, which it calls baseline pro—
tAll ufc~cncc to ‘c us iii tlu,s ouch tic to Re,! c It nish ss
otherwise indicated.
jections.‘‘‘The administration’s spending plan will
he presented in light of these baseline projections,
Any assessment of current developments and
future trends, moreover, requires a sense of his-
torical perspective.3 Thus, this article re\-iews the
course of k~dera1spending over the last 25 \‘ears,
focusing on the growth of federal outlays relative to
the size of the economvas measured by GNP.
Trends in the composition of federal spending hr
major program category also are summarized.
PAST TRENDS IN FEDERAL
SPENDING: 1955-80
ro obtain a sense of historical perspective on
k~cleralspending, trends are examined for the period
1955 through 1980. Using 1955 as a starting point
removes most of the influence of World War 11 and
the Korean War, periods of extensive defense spend-
ing, vet the period still includes the Cold War ofthe
l9SOs and the Vietnam War. Excluding all defense
buildups is undesirable since political and inter-
national conditions will always impinge to some
degree on decision—making processes relating to
federal spending.
onLlcsslon ii !3wLc t Oilier I3ou tnt, BocLc t i,ojcc 000s
Tireo! )eorcc ]9~i2-l5.lBbjuly IYRIL
3
The purpose of the article is to describe, rather titan analyze,
icderai spending trends, l’or a discussion of the theoretueai Isasis
for ‘-ariot’s gos-ernunenta! activities. set’ Richard .A. Mitsgras c and
Peggy B. \lnisgrave, t’nIi/ic Fiocinc’,- in i’hc’c’rp our
1
i’n’oc’lic’e. 2nd
cc!.. (Mr-Craw-Ui!! Book Consspainv, 1976(, See also Saun
Pcitznnn Ihc I uasth oh C oscninnicnt lit, Jcsnunol of Ito
ott,! Leoncnnicac (Oetohc’r l980(. pp. 209—58.
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To tes mew trendsin feder’il spending it is useful to C
c itegoriie fedetal outlax s The Office of Managc — /
inent and Budget deselops tla budget each scar in
two fundamental xx ax s. bx agencx and hs funetion.~
rh~5categoriLations are impomtant for th budge t
p1‘tnnine p ocess but for this at tide, a small
numbc r of catetrorie is prefei ahie. Thc catc got
iz’ttion cho en is b~major progu am a c’ttc gorization
us d~ the CBO.
L. fVL’jorP g C /
Cat got‘zing fedet al outlas s bs in ‘~or rogr’un
s ential lx dix ides goseminent actis itie s into dc—
fhns and non—defense spending. The lattet catcgors
is fuithet suhclisided aceordin to the firm that this
spending takes.
T’tble I summarizes the major prog amcite gorse ~ /
u ‘ci as a basis fot assessing federal spending t ends. /
National defense consist mainly of the miiitars
ic tix itie of the Dcp’utment of Defense. The dc —
len ec tt ‘gois boss is-er ‘ulso includes benefit c
pas ment foi retired mu itan per onnel and Dc— C
pattment of Fnerey pi o rr’tm s di’. rtc ci toward
national ddense
In thc non clefense category, the largest eons—
ponent con ists of b ~neflt payments to individuals.
These programs include direct payments from the
— federal government to individuals (e.g., social
4
The hnclgc’t !sreakdowns used by [lie Office (SF Manageirient anrl security and fideral retirement pay’) and indirect
Budget are as follows: payments through state and local governments (e.g.,
By ,‘tgr’nir’y By l’niic’tion public assistance and! child nutrition). Some pro-
heg islati ye ,n It! juclicial Natioi ml deft’it se
In turIn s tnt, ni ttioit dl ~.. gi iris pioxide c ish p ix ments for iccipients to use it
Funds appropriated to the Genera! science, space mit! their cliscretion, while other programs provide
president technology specific seryices (e.g., Medicare and Medicaid).
Agriculture Energy
Defense — 51 ilitao Natural resources and Crants to state and local governments, other than
Defense — Civil environment . ‘ -
F chic anon \,i it ultonc be ncfit p is mc nts mUncIe ge ncr il mc’.enuc sh irung,
Energy Commerce and housing credit the Comprehensiye Employment and! Training Act,
Health mud Htiinan Services Transportation ‘ education, community dle\’elopment, highway con-
Hin’snng and Urhan C on nunnits’ and regiona!
Development development struction, etc.
Inter!or F(In catiott, training. , ,,
Iwaitt t nsplos inc mit nd il ‘s t niten st is the intc i e st p iid C) n th it pottion of
Lahor sen-ices the federal debt held by the public. This is’’~~ net
State - health - figure because it excludes interest paid to gos’—
Transpot-tat iott incoinc’ steu rib.’
I it ‘sun t tt m nis Ut ucfits md ~ ~ cinmc nt trust funds th it hold go’. cinment sc ciiiities
Environmental Protection Administration ofjustice while including interest payments from federal
Agener General gos enunient agencies’’and the public on borrowing from the
Nationa! Ac’ronatit Cs anti Ct’s era! piirpiise Oscal ‘ -
Space Aduiiinstration assistance gox’ernment.
o 10ce of personitei Interest ‘
management Allowances Other federal operations include farm price sup—
Veter,nis administration Undistrihntecl nffsetting ports, domestic energy’ programs, foreign aid, gen—
Other agencies receipts eral science research, space technology, etc. in
Allowances
Untlistrihtited offsetting addition, general expenses required to run the
receipts gov’eri’iment are included in tins category.
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Outlays Relative to GNP
A yery useful way to summarize trends in federal
spc’nchng is to compare them with the growth of
CNP. a comparison that i nclicates the degree of
governisent intervention in the economy. Chart 1
summarizes the historical record by showing total
federal outlay’s and! the major program categories
as a percent of CNP.
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The trend oftotal budget outlays relative to CNP
has been unmistakably upward during the 1955-80
period, rising from 17.9 percent in 1955 to 22.6
percent in 1980. This trend has not been smooth,
however,in thatoutlays relativeto GNPhavesurged
in relatively short periods. Though the percentage
tends to subside after the surge, it returns to levels
higher than prevailed before the surge. The surges
during the 1955-80 period seem to be associated
with (1) the 1957-58 recession and the abbreviated
recoverythatfollowed, (2)the VietnamWar, and (3)
the 1973-75 recession. But the reason outlays as a
percent ofCNPdoesnotreturn to pre-surge levels is
unclear, except, perhaps, as a resultof the momen-
tum ofthe government spending process.
National defense spending relative to GNP de-
clined throughout 1955-80 except for the period of
the Vietnam War. In 1955, 10.4 percent of the na-
tion’s GNP was directed toward defense outlays, a
percentage that declined to 7.2 percent in 1965,
before rising to 9.4 percentduring the Vietnam War
in 1968. Since then,the decline has been dramatic,
with the ratio plummeting to 5 percent in 1978 and
1979.
Meanwhile, benefit payments for individuals
were only 3.7 percent of GNP in 1955 with social
securityaccountingfor31.4percent ofthe total.With
a major surge in the 1967-76 period, benefit pay-
ments hit 10.6 percent of GNP in 1980 as social
security rose to 43.2 percent of the total. Given the
decline in national defense, the bulk ofthe relative
rise in total outlays over the 1955-80 period is
attributable to the sharp increase in benefit pay-
ments to individuals.
The remaining major program categories, though
relativelysmall,showsome trends, Net interestwas
virtuallyconstant at 1.3 percent ofGNP from 1955 to
1968. Since then, the trend hasbeen upward as the
government runs continuous deficits and interest
rates keep rising, Net interest reached 2.0percent of
GNP in 1980.
Other grants to state and local governments, the
smallestcategory in 1955,has been trendingupward
throughoutthe period (notshownseparately in chart
1). Starting at 0.4 percent of GNP in 1955, these
grants rose to 2.2 percent in 1980.
All other outlays relative to GNP, a residual coin-
ponent ofthe total, changed little on balance from
1955 to 1980.
More recently, from 1975 to 1980, federal spend-
ing has grown only slightly faster than GNP. Total
ouflays averaged22.6 percentofGNP in 1980, with
the decline in defenseoffset by an upward creep in
non-defense categories.
Program Categories Relative to
Total Outlays
Another way of looking at federal spending is to
examine the composition oftotal outlays. Using the
same program categories as before, chart 2 summa-
rizesthe compositionoffederaloutlays for 1955-80.
Chart 2 showsthe changing compositionofbudget
outlays more dramatically than chart 1, though the
samebasicdataare used in the constructionofboth.
The sharply decliningportion ofthe budget for na-
tionaldefenseis immediately evident. In 1955, 58.1
percentoftotaloutlayswentto defense;by 1980,this
proportion haddwindled to 23.4 percent, though the
trend has been relativelystable since 1976.
The rise in benefit payments for individuals as a
percent of total outlays, which has more than
doubledsince 1955, actually took place during two
subperiods. First was the period from 1955 to 1961,
which includedtwo recessions with aweak recovery
sandwiched in between. Second wasthe period from
1968to 1976, aperiod ofexpandingsocial programs
that also included two recessions.
Net interest held steady at about 1 percent oftotal
outlays from 1955 to 1974. Since then, the percent-
age has been rising slowly butsteadily.
Other grants to state and local governments ex-
hibitedan upwardtrend from 1955 to 1973,buthave
since leveled off. All other outlays, on the other
hand, have variedconsiderably,risingsharply from
1955 to 1965, declining until 1974,then stabilizing
in the late 1970s.
In summary, the composition of the budget has
undergone a substantial change over the last 25
years. While national defense used to be far and
away the most important function of the federal
government, this category has yielded to social
programs in the form ofbenefits forindividuals.The
sum ofthese two large program categories has de-
clined asa percentoftotal outlays from 78.5percent
in 1955 to 70.2 percent in 1980. The slack has been
taken up by an increasing proportion of outlays
channeled to stateand local government and paid in
interest to the public.
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Chart 2
Federal Budget Outlays as a Percent of Total OutIays~
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BASELINE PROJECTIONS OF
FEDERAL SPENDING: 1981-86
An evaluation of spending plans for the future
requiresa baseline for comparison,namely,acourse
that federal spending would follow were there no
changes in spending policies.A setofsuch baseline
projections has been prepared by the CBO and is
presented here.
CBO’s Economic Assumptions
The projections assume that expenditures are
based on spending policies and laws in effect as of
December 1980. With respect to so-called entitle-
ment programs (social security, Medicaid, veterans
pensions, federal employee retirement, etc.), it is
assumed thatfuture spending will respond to eco-
nomic anddemographic changes in thesamewayas
in the past.
Since the remainingportionoffederal outlaysare
discretionary, that is, they depend on annual appro-
priations, special assumptions are required. The
general assumption is that programs in effect in
December 1980 will continue into the fixture with
increases in outlays a reflection ofthe rate of infla-
tion. Thus, inflation rates are a critical part of the
economic assumptions. In the case ofnational de-
fense, CBO’s baseline projections also include an
allowance for programmatic changes. Specifically,
projections ofoutlays are consistent with a defense
force and investment program that is implied by
congressional action through December 1980.
The future course offederaloutlays thusdepends
on the underlying economic assumptions. The
CEO’s economic assumptions are summarized in
table 2. Withabout 30 percent offederal spending
directly indexed for inflation, the inflation as-
sumptions bear considerable weight In addition,
the costs of many other programs are based on the
assumption that congressional actions will provide
the funding to keep the programs apace with in-
flation. There are also programs like unemploy-
mentcompensation and food stamps thatdepend on
the assumptions made about unemployment. Net
interest paid depends on interest rate projections as
well as future deficits.
In general, the CEO’s economic assumptions are
taken as given for the baseline budget projections.
There is no allowance for the feedback of fiscal
actions to the economy. For example, CEO notes
that the projected surplus in the baseline budget
would be inconsistent with the underlying eco-
nomic assumptions. In other words, their economic
assumptions do not represent the output of a full-
fledged econometric model.
CBO’s Baseline Projections
Chart 1 summarizes the baseline projections as a
percentofGNP for 1981-86. The momentum oftotal
outlays as well as high inflation projections in the
near term indicate a slight rise in total outlays in
1981-82 relative to 1980. After 1982, total outlays
decline relative to GNP. There are several reasons
forthis. First,the baseline projectionsdo notprovide
for real growth in a number ofprogram areas, while
the GNPprojections include substantial increases in
real GNP. Second, with unemploymentassumed to
decline, programs tied to the unemployment rate
grow more slowly. Similarly, net interest outlays
decline, assuming declines in interest rates and in
the deficit.5
The national defense component of federal out-
lays is assumed to hold fitirly constant under the
baseline assumptions, implying real growth in
defenseoutlays. The niajor reason for an increase in
realterms isan increaseinthe cost ofstrategicforces,
namely,the inclusion offunding for the MX missile
andanewmannedbomber.Consequently, basedon
programmatic changes implied by congressional
action through December 1980, defense outlays
would be 5.2 percentofGNP in 1986,little changed
from 5.3 percent in 1980.
Benefit payments for individuals are projected to
rise in 1981-82 relative to GNP, but fall slowly from
1983-86. The proportion stays high relative to CNP
because so manyofthe benefitprogramsare indexed
to inflation. The most importantof these are social
security benefits, railroad retirement benefits, sup-
plemental security income, veterans’ pensions, and
civil service retirement benefits. Other programs,
like food stamps and child nutrition,unemployment
compensation, and Medicare and Medicaid, are in-
directly tied to inflation. But in addition to keeping
pacewith inflation, benefit paymentsfor individuals
rise frster thanthe pricelevelbecause the numberof
‘Itsbould be notedthatthe CBO’sbaselineestimateofnetinterest
does not reflect filly the surplus/deficit estimates Implied by
theirfull setofbaseline estimatesofrevenues andexpenditures.
Forpurposes oltheirbaseline spending projections,thebudget
was assumed to be balanced beginning in 1984, and the sub-
stantial surpluses estimatedafter 1984 were not assumed to be
applied to reductions in the public debt.
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Other grants to state and local governments are
projected to decline to 1.5 percent of GNP in 1986
compared with 2.2 percent in 1980. This would be a
decline in real terms and is accounted for in part by
statutory ceilings on social service grants and gen-
eral revenue sharing. Furthermore, community de-
velopment grants are projected to rise little under
existing law.
Baseline projections for net interest indicate a
substantial decline relative to GNP, from 2.0 percent
in 1980 to 1.2 percent in 1986. This projection is a
direct result of the economic assumption that in-
terest rates will decline throughout the period and
that the budget will he balanced by 1984.
The catch—all category! of ‘‘all other’’ is also pro-
jected todecline — from 2.4 percent of CNP in 1980
to 1.7 percent in 1986. Implicit in the projection is
that “all other” outlays will keeppace with inflation
though they will show no real growth.
The implications of the baseline projections for
the composition off~deraloutlaysare summarized in
chart 2. Benefit payments are slated to stay high,
rising somewhat relative to the total. Benefit
payments, 46.8 percent of total outlays in 1980, are
projected to rise to 51.0 percent based on existing
law.
With the sum of benefit payments and national
defense rising from 70.2 percent of total outlays in
1980 to 77.7 percent in 1986, there is asubstantially
lesser proportion of the total going toward the
remaining three categories. These categories share
the decline about equally, dropping about 2o r3
percentage poiuts from 1980 to 1986.
ADMINISTRATION PROJECTIONS OF
FEDERAL SPENDING: 1981-86
The new administration announced a program of
spending cuts shortly after taking office early this
year. These proposals were first presented in March
and subsequently revised in the mid-session review
of the budget in July.5 Controversy surrounding
these proposals probably will continue as the ad-
ministration works with Congress in reviewing
these proposals. For the purposes ofthis article, the
estimates of the administration as of July 15, 1981,
are used because they are the most current set of
officially published estimates. The final results will
differ from those presented here, but the July pro-
posals are representative ofthe administration’s plan.
°Office oF Management and Budget, Fiscal lear 1982 B ,daet
Raeisions (March 198 1) and Mid—Session BeeIc te of (lie 1982
Budget (Juk 15, 1981).
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retirees and disabled persons grows. Baseline
projections indicate benefit payments would he 10
percent of GNP in 1986 compared with 10.6 percent
in 1980.
The future pattern of national defense relative to
total outlays also is one of steady increase. National
defense, which was 23.4 percent of total outlays in
1980, is projected to rise to 26.7 percent in 1986
assuming the expansion of strategic forces.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS NOVEMBER 1981
Economic Assumptions
As alluded to above, any spending proposals
depend on theparticular economic assumptions that
are made. Table 3 summarizes the administration’s
economic assumptions as presented in the mid—
session review of the budget on July 15. These
assumptions are similar to CBO’s in that they are
called assumptions, not projections. The adminis-
tration goes slightly further, however, saving that
these assumptions are projections of the trend of
economic performance expected undler the adminis-
trations new policy. So, even though these assump-
tions did) not appear to he based! on a consistently
estimated econometric nmdel, they’ do allow for the
feedback of economic policies to the economic as-
sumptions, albeit in an informal way.
A compari son of table 3 with the CBO’s assump-
tions in table 2 indicates that the general contours of
the economic projections are similar. The course of
CNF and its distribution between prices and output
is essentially the same for the administration as for
the CBO. Forexample, the difference in the average
annual rate of increase of nominal GNP over the
1980-86 period! is only 0.1 percentage point —
11.1 percent for the administration compared with
11.2 percent for the CBO. The principal difference
in the two sets of economic assumptions is with
respect to interest rates; the administration assumes
Treasury hills will decline to 5.5 percent in 1986
compared with 6.0 percent for the CBO.
Administration Spending Projections
In general, theadministration plans to redluce total
outlays relative to CNP from 22.6 percent in 1980 to
18.6 percent in 1986. In comparison, the CBO pro-
jects total outlays tobe 19.6 percent ofGNP in 1986.
in 1986 dollars, this dhfferenee amounts to 855
billion (see table 4); in other words, the adlminis—
tration is proposing that total outlays be reduded by
$55 billion from what the~would otherwise he,
based on existing law.
The major departure of the adhninisti-ation’s plan
from the baseline projections is that it plans a sharp
increase in national defense spendling even as a
percent of GNP. The administration’s plan calls for
defense spending to he 6.7 percent of GNP in 1986
compared with 5.2 percent for the baseline projec-
tions. This would! he the largest proportion of GNP
diverted to defense since 1972.
With total outlays projected! to decline relative to
GNP and national defense projected to increase,
non—defense must decline sharply as a percent of
GNP. The largest componentof non-defense outlays
— benefit payments for indlividluals — is projected at
8.5 percent ofCNP in 1986compared with abaseline
figure of 10.0 percent. In 1986 dollars, this is a re—
dluetion of $73.I hillion, or 15 percent. IncI tidied! in
the administration’s reduction in henefit payments is
the cutback in social security benefits that generated!
considerable controversy’ last spring and! suhse—
quentlv was withdlrawn pending the recommendia—
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tions ofa new commission,7 Although social security
benefits as a percent of total benefit payments to
persons would rise slightly, such benefits as a per-
cent ofGNP wouldl d!rop from 4.5 percent in 1980 to
4.1 percent in 1986.
Of the remaining program categories, only net
interest is close to the baseline projection for 1986.
As a percent of CNP, net interest is projected! at 1.3
percent of GNP, essentially the same as the 1.2 per-
cent baseline projection.8 The other two remaining
categories are sharply below the baseline projec-
tions. All other grants to state and local governments
are projected! hv the adlmninistration at0.9 percent of
GNP compared with 1.5 percent fOr the baseline
projection, a cuthaek of$28 billion in 1986 d!ollars, or
‘The set 1)1 propOsit! s tileeting soc al security inciodeci t lie
following:
ii Reduci iig the we!fare—on enteci elmii ci its Htat d ‘pl Icate other
programs
(2) Relating disability beneFits more closely to a person’s work
his tory and tic,dical conch t ions;
(3) Re dii cm g the opports,ni ty for ‘‘windfall’’ hei,efits;
(4) Sinftiug the effective date for paving Hie auto static cost—of —
Ii ‘-in g increases from July to d)ctolicr:
(5) Enconraging workers to stay on tIle j oh, at
1
e ist uI,ti I the
traditional retireme itt age of 65;
(6) tMwer Ig ilito re rep!acenl ont rates — tIit- in iti d henefit as
con pareci with rece,it p ,‘eretireitieut earnings
veil HI o‘‘gil the ad liii nistration assdimc-s titat iiite rest rates will
he lower hy 1986, its estimate of net interest exceeds the haselilie
projection beeaiise its die 6cit c’sti mates are larger (or s 5, rpluse
are s usallc-r) ciun, g tiit’ proieetion I ‘en od, The reason for tIns is
titat the 1)asehne revet, die prc)iec’t ionsare based on tax laws as of
December 1980. ‘s-hereas the acimin istration’s m~I:sn nc lu cli’s tIle
tax cot,
40 percent, which would bring this category hack to
1963 levels. Similarly with the “all other” category,
the administration’s plan calls for all other outlays to
he scaled! hack to 1.1 percent of GNP compared with
1.7 percent for the baseline projection. Fhis would!
he a reduction of $26.4 billion in 1986 dollars, or 32
percent, and wouldl bring this category- lower than
ever recordledl in the 1955—80 period.
The scope of’ the administration’s program is
dramatized even more when one examines the pro-
gram categories relative to total outlays. In order to
reduce total outlay’s 1w 855 billion in 1986 relative to
haseline projections and! at the same time increase
national defOnse by $72 billion, the administration
must reduce non—defense outlays by $126 hilhon.
F’urthermore, xvitli an administration net interest
projection of S2 billion greater tkm the baseline
estimate, the remaining categories mttst he reduced1
by $128 billion. Given the haseline proJection of
~‘637hillion fornon—defenseexcluding net interest, a
$128 billion cuthack translates into a2 0percent re—
d!uction from what they’ would! otherwise he.
As a percent of total outlay’s, the national defense
projection amounts to 36.4 percent compared with
26.7 percent fOr the baseline projection. To achieve
such a goal would! give dlefense an importance in the
hudget not realized since 1970.
The scaling hack of benefit pay-mnents would! re-
duce such payments- asa percent ofthe total to 45.9
percent d’ompared! with 50.9percent fOr the baseline.
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On this basis,this would be the lowestshare forthis
category of spending since 1974.
Withnet interest being projected at 6.8percent of
totaloutlays compared with6.2 percent for thebase-
line, the other reductions come from the two re-
maining catch-allcategories. All othergrants to state
and local governments would be reduced to 4.8
percent ofthe budgetcompared with 7.5percent fin
the baseline. Thiswould be the smallestproportion
ofthe budget for this category since 1963.
The final “all other” category, according to ad-
ministration projections, would be reduced to 6.2
percentoftotaloutlayscompared withan 8.6percent
baseline projection. This would be lower than any
other year In the 1955-80 period.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The administration has embarked on a budget
program designedto reducethe size ofgovernment
in the U.S. economy. Atthe sametime, theypropose
toalter greatly the compositionofthe budget Over
the last 25 years, federal outlaysgrew more rapidly
than the nation’s GNP. At the samelime, thecom-
position of these outlays shifted toward greater
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non-defense spending, particularly benefit pay-
ments for individuals.
In planning for the next five or six years, the
administration has set forth proposals designed to
alter past trends. One goal is to reduce the overall
growth offederaloutlays relative to GNP.According
to the administration’s plan, outlays will be 18.6
percent ofCNP in 1986, down from 22.6 percent in
1980, reducingthe relative size ofgovernment to its
lowest level since 1966. Existing law indicates that
outlays are scheduled to be reducedrelative to GM’
anyway,butto 19.6 percentratherthan 18.6percent.
Slowing the momentum of government spending
is an ambitious goal, butthe way in which the ad-
ministration proposesto achieveit makes thetask all
the more difficult By announcing a goal ofacceler-
atingdefensespendingwhile slowingthe growthof
total outlays, the administration implies that sharp
cutbacks are required fornon-defense spendingrel-
ative to baseline projections. The scaling back of
non-defense programs other than net interest
amounts to 20 percent compared withbaseline pro-
jections. Relative to baseline projections, this non-
defense cutback is distributed as a 15 percent
reduction in benefit payments for individuals, 40
percent for other grants to state and local govern-
ments, and 32 percent for the all other category.
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